J. JB News/Calls for Papers > Areteic Thought of the Day: John Dupre on the Demarcation Problem
John called for the use of a virtue epistemological approach to the demarcation problem - determining the epistemic credentials of various disciplines in terms of their recognition and application of epistemic virtues. However, the virtues John gestures to are properties of theories - like empirical adequacy - rather than of agents (like humility, generosity, etc.), but in correspondence he has indicated his sympathy with the latter approach. In that interview, for instance, he recognises clarity and humour as epistemic virtues which agents should strive for - ones he manifests, in fact - though I do not know if humour is an epistemic virtue (!)
November 16, 2011 |
Ian James Kidd
Ian James Kidd
Ian, I think you make a good point about the difference between agential virtues and virtues of theories-often referred to as "cognitive values" in the philosophy of swcience literature. However, I think that a virtue epistemology should incorporate concerns with both types. It would be shortsighted for VE to ignore its rich connections with cogntive values, for at least two reasons:
1) these also are "ampliative" or non-deductive criteria of theory choice, and
2) they application demands proper weighing and application, so that the individual agent is thoroughly involved-they are not mere rule-following.
So in a paper I'm working on, I try to show how cognitive values are central to much scientific theory-choice, but bon sens and personal virtues become central as desiderata in episodes of theory choice in science, or simply other fields where underdetermination issues are persistent or the norm--interpretive fields like history-writing, for example.
1) these also are "ampliative" or non-deductive criteria of theory choice, and
2) they application demands proper weighing and application, so that the individual agent is thoroughly involved-they are not mere rule-following.
So in a paper I'm working on, I try to show how cognitive values are central to much scientific theory-choice, but bon sens and personal virtues become central as desiderata in episodes of theory choice in science, or simply other fields where underdetermination issues are persistent or the norm--interpretive fields like history-writing, for example.
November 28, 2011 |
Guy Axtell
Guy Axtell
John Dupre is a noted philosopher of science who applies virtue theory to the quest for demarcation criteria between science and non-science:
"The concept of demarcation is not especially problematic provided it is made clear that it is simply a word for distinguishing science from non-science. Having said that, …the concept of demarcation tends to suggest that there is a sharp line and some definite criterion that sorts the scientific sheep from the scientific goats. I think this is a highly misleading picture. History and philosophy are not (in the English speaking world anyhow) considered to be sciences, but they can be entirely credible grounds of knowledge. And sciences differ greatly in their epistemic credentials. As I argued in The Disorder of Things, I think we are much better off to think in terms of epistemic virtues, features of an investigative practice that confer credibility. No doubt the cardinal empirical virtue is a proper connection with empirical evidence, which is the large grain of truth in the criterion of falsificationism."
Share your thoughts on the workability of Dupre's approach to the Demarcation Problem!
Source quoted: http://www.galilean-library.org/site/index.php/topic/3302-john-dupre-the-disunity-of-science/