Gambrel & Cafaro's paper is available along with Swanton's "Heideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics" andothers in the *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*

Abstract In this paper we explore material simplicity, defined as the virtue disposing us to act appropriately within the sphere of our consumer decisions. Simplicity is a conscientious and restrained attitude toward material goods that typically includes (1) decreased consumption and (2) a more conscious consumption; hence (3) greater deliberation regarding our consumer decisions; (4) a more focused life in
general; and (5) a greater and more nuanced appreciation for other things besides material goods, and also for (6) material goods themselves. It is to be distinguished from simple-mindedness, a return to nature, or poverty. Simplicity overlaps with traditional virtues such as temperance, frugality, and wisdom, and sustains and
enables traditional virtues such as justice and generosity. Simplicity is a virtue
because it furthers human flourishing, both individual and social, and sustains nature’s ecological flourishing. For analytic purposes, we consider six areas in which simplicity can make important contributions: (1) basic individual flourishing,
(2) basic societal flourishing, (3) individual freedom or autonomy, (4) the acquisition
of knowledge, (5) living meaningfully, and (6) preserving and protecting
nonhuman beings. The proven failure of materialism to secure subjective happiness
or objective flourishing argues for the practice of voluntary simplicity and for the
radical reform of modern consumer societies.
Keywords Simplicity
Consumption
Temperance
Virtue

http://www.springerlink.com/content/t1680k1217518447/fulltext.pdf

Christine Swanton, Heideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics.
Environmental ethics is apparently caught in a dilemma. We believe in human species partiality as a way of making sense of many of our practices. However as part of our commitment to impartialism in ethics, we arguably should extend the principle of impartiality to other species, in a version of biocentric egalitarianism of the kind advocated by Paul Taylor. According to this view, not only do all entities that possess a good have inherent worth, but they have equal inherent worth, (...)
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m48457719l708v68/fulltext.pdf

Thanks for "The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue." This looks like a dynamic paper in environmental virtue ethics, which is itself a promising approach, and I'll look forward to printing and reading it.