H. Social Epistemology, Pragmatism & Virtue Theory > Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC) & the JanusBlog: Collective Visions

JB readers might be interested to check out and consider joining the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC), run by James Collier, whose focal question is "How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized?" The topics under discussion there highlight symmetries between social, feminist, and virtue epistemologies, especially in their shared concern for the improvement of inquiry, that is, of knowledge-producing and transmitting practices. This cross-post hopes to encourage more work in social and collective epistemology

Among JBers in SERRC is Philip Olson whose contribution to the Collective Vision page is "Wanting to Believe and the Burden of Knowing," writes "Running against the grain of traditional epistemology’s insistence upon the value of knowledge and the deficiency of ignorance, growing numbers of scholars have insisted, over the past ten years, that “the study of ignorance is a valuable tool for liberatory epistemologies” (Tuana and Sullivan 2006). Ignorance may refer not only to a lack of knowledge, but also to active and strategic knowledge practices that serve the interests of privileged social groups, at the expense of non-dominant groups. Ignorance wields a veiled power."

Eric Kerr of U. of Singapore also connects VE in his passage on the "Group Credit View":

"What I am here calling the Group Credit View is beginning to be explored by epistemologists interested in the implications of the Extended Mind thesis for epistemology and, in particular, for credit theories, virtue reliabilism, and the ability intuition (e.g. Carter et al. 2014; Goldberg 2010; Hetherington 2012; Kelp 2013; Kerr and Gelfert 2014; Palermos and Pritchard 2013; Pritchard 2010; Vaesen 2011). The central idea here is that if you think that knowledge is something to do with an ability, achievement or is, in the relevant sense, creditable to an agent then it looks like you are committed to either endorsing group knowledge or distinguishing group and individual knowledge because of ‘biological’ (i.e. non-epistemic) considerations. Given that there are many instances where it does not seem appropriate to credit any individual within a group with knowledge (e.g. her knowledge depends too much on the cognitive work of others) and yet it does seem that someone or perhaps something should be credited with knowledge, then it looks like there are also many instances of group knowledge."

Visit the SERRC Collective Vision page:
June 2, 2014 | Registered CommenterGuy Axtell