CONTRIBUTORS

G. Naturalism & Normativity > New Collection: Thick Concepts (OUP, 2013) Simon Kirchin, editor

"Excited" is only a thin way of expressing my enthusiasm over this great collection featurings many renown philosophers as well as some strong new voices on questions about how thick concepts are related to reasons and action; how sharp the division is between thin and thick concepts; and how ethical, epistemic, and aesthetic normativity are to be understood. Kirchin and his contributors indeed show us that

"These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works."

The editor, who is rumoured to be working at a monograph on thick an thin concepts and normativity, is also author of Metaethics (Palgrave, 2012).

Thick Concepts (OUP, 2013): http://global.oup.com/academic/product/thick-concepts-9780199672349?cc=us&lang=en&tab=overview

Contents

1. Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts, Simon Kirchin

2. Thick Concepts, Analysis, and Reductionism, Edward Harcourt and Alan Thomas

3. Practical Concepts, Jonathan Dancy

4. Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions, Simon Kirchin

5. It's Evaluation, only Thicker, Debbie Roberts

6. On the Nature and Significance of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts, Michael Smith

7. Disentangling Disentangling, Simon Blackburn

8. Thick Concepts and Underdetermination, Pekka Vayrynen

9. Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality, Matti Eklund

10. There are no Thin Concepts, Timothy Chappell

11. Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: what Moral Philosophy can Learn from Aesthetics, Nick Zangwill

12. Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action, Eric
Wiland

13. Well-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of Labor between Moral Philosophy and Positive Psychology, Valerie Tiberius

Index

The OUP order site gives this Description:

"What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works." http://global.oup.com/academic/product/thick-concepts-9780199672349?cc=us&lang=en&tab=description

Congrats to Simon Kirchin, for whom this collection in the Mind Association Occasional Series at OUP culminates multiple papers of his own and a major UK-based conference. The collection features

"New work from a team of leading experts;
The first book-length study on the subject;
Includes a comprehensive introduction, which provides an overview of the current and historic field."
June 7, 2013 | Registered CommenterGuy Axtell