E. Education; Philosophy of Deliberative Democracy > C. Miller's "Motivating Reasons" Available (NOUS)

Christian Miller's paper has just appeared in NOUS, and can be printed by those with library suscription.

Abstract: The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatis-faction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first person
practical deliberation and third-person action explanations. So after first introducing some assumptions about the nature of agency in section one, I will turn to articulating and defending this account of motivating reasons
in sections two through four of the paper. Section five then provides some background on the Humean theory before I argue directly against it in section six and critically examine the leading arguments for the view in section seven. Given limitations of space, however, I save the task of developing a positive anti-Humean view for another occasion.
May 15, 2008 | Registered CommenterGuy Axtell