According to Aristotle and other virtue theorists, virtues are concerned with actions and feelings. Suppose that for each virtue there are certain actions and feelings characteristic of that virtue. The idea is that to possess a given virtue V is to be disposed to manifest the actions and feelings characteristic of V (V-relevant actions and feelings).

But of course it is inconsistent with the possession of V that one manifest V-relevant actions and feelings without any regard for when, where, how, to whom, etc., this is done. The mere giving of one’s resources, and doing so with the appropriate feelings, is not sufficient for an exercise of generosity. A generous person gives in the right amount, in the right way, at the right time, for the right reason, to the right person, in the right situation, etc. Call these the “normative parameters” of a virtue. The idea, then, is that to possess a virtue V, one must be disposed to manifest V-relevant actions and feelings within these parameters, that is, to do so in the right amount, toward the right person, in the right situation, for the right reason, etc.

The doctrine of the mean, I take it, is supposed to map onto the normative parameters of virtue and thereby to illuminate the basic structure of a virtue. To “hit the mean” with respect to a virtue V just is to manifest V-relevant actions and feelings in the right amount, in the right way, at the right time, etc. That this is Aristotle’s view seems clearly indicated by passages like the following:

“… virtue of character … is concerned with feelings and actions, and it is in these that we find excess, deficiency and the mean. For example, fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and in general pleasure and pain can be experienced too much or too little, and in both ways not well. But to have them at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the mean and best; and this is the business of virtue” (NE, 1106b).

But here’s a problem. The notion of a mean, and in particular a mean between a vice of _excess_ and _deficiency_, is _quantitative_ in nature, which in turn suggests that failing to hit the mean is a matter of “too much” or “too little.” This is evident in the passage just noted. And it makes good sense with respect to certain normative parameters of most any virtue. For example, one way to fail to possess the virtue of courage is to feel too much confidence (rashness); another is to feel too little (cowardice). Similarly, I can fail to be generous either by giving away too many of my resources (wastefulness) or too few (stinginess). The problem, however, is that not all (or even most) of the relevant normative parameters are quantitative in nature. Hitting the mean is not always (or even mostly) a matter of avoiding “too much” or “too little” or manifesting a given virtue-relevant action or feeling “enough but not too much.” If this is right, then the notion of a mean between excess and deficiency seems not to be a helpful way of understanding the normative structure of a virtue.

Consider the parameter of “right reason.” In what sense is being _ill-motivated_ (or acting for the wrong reason) a matter of “too much” or “too little”? Suppose I give generously, but for purely selfish reasons. In what sense is my giving indicative of a vice of excess or deficiency? To be sure, my giving is _deficient_ in that I am giving for the _wrong_ reason. But my failure here is not a matter of “too little”; it’s not a quantitative failure.

Or suppose I give generously, and for the right reason, but to people or organizations that I have reason to think will make immoral use of my resources. Clearly I’ve gotten things wrong with respect to the object of my giving. But again, in what sense is my mistake a matter of “too much” or “too little”? Or in what sense is giving to the “_right_ person” a matter of giving “enough but not too much”?

Finally, consider the parameter of “right time” or “right situation.” Suppose I communicate the truth about something to a loved one, but in a situation that is likely to cause this person unnecessary embarrassment or at a time when this person is likely to be needlessly wounded by my words. Clearly I’ve failed to tell the truth at the “right time” or in the “right situation.” But again, what counts as the “right time” or “right situation” would not appear to be a matter of anything quantitative – it’s not a matter of “going far enough, but not too far,” of avoiding excess and deficiency.

The normative parameter that _does_ readily admit of a quantitative characterization is, of course, “right amount.” Here, getting things right typically _is_ a matter of “enough but not too much” – it is a matter of avoiding both excess and deficiency. But again, this is but one of several parameters. And if the doctrine of the mean is going to shed significant light on the normative structure of a virtue, surely it must cover more parameters than this.

To come at the issue in another way, consider the sort of advice we might give to a virtuous-person-in-training interested in “getting things right” with respect to virtue-relevant actions and feelings. If this person asked, “How much of my income should I give to charity?” we might respond: “Some but not too much.” But suppose this person asked “What should my motivation be?” or “To whom shall I give?” Here an answer in terms of “some but not too much” would be of little help. That’s because getting things right in these areas just isn’t a matter of striking a mean between excess and deficiency.

Let me briefly try to head off an objection. You might say that when I give to the wrong person or when I tell the truth in the wrong situation or at the wrong time, I give or tell “excessively” in the sense that I give or tell when I ought not to have. The main problem with this objection (there are others) is that it threatens to render the doctrine of the mean uninteresting and distracting. For it implies that “striking a mean between excess and deficiency” is simply a matter of engaging in virtue-relevant activity when doing so is called for (thereby avoiding “deficiency”) and not engaging in virtue-relevant activity when doing so is not called for (thereby avoiding “excess”). But if that’s what it is to “hit the mean,” why bother appealing to the notion of a mean in the first place? Why not simply say that to be virtuous, one must engage in virtue-relevant activity when it’s appropriate to do so and to avoid engaging in virtue-relevant activity it’s inappropriate to do so?

Here’s a quick summary of the basic worry. The doctrine of the mean is supposed to illuminate the normative structure of a virtue. But the normative dimensions of virtues are not strictly or even primarily quantitative in nature and therefore don’t readily admit of quantitative analysis. Therefore, the doctrine of the mean – a quantitative notion – fails to shed much light on the normative structure of a virtue.

Thanks for putting up with the excessive (!) length of this post. I’d be very interested to hear others’ thoughts about this issue – including whether I’m reiterating an argument that’s already in the literature (to my knowledge I’m not).

Jason, The objections seem forceful against the doctrine of the mean as the idea that every virtue admits of correspondingvices of too little and too much. I just wonder how many contemporary ethicists hold that Aristotelian view anyway? With the recent conference on Virtue East & West, we might think whether the Confucian doctrine of the golden mean avoids the objections.

[To follow these heavenly instructions by learning and teaching will automatically result in a Confucian virtue. Because Heaven has laid down what is the way to perfect virtue, it is not that difficult to follow the steps of the holy rulers of old if one only knows what is the right way. Chan (1963: unpaginated) in an English translation of the Doctrine, renders "Mean" as an "Equilibrium" identified as "Harmony":

"While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony. This Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this Harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue."]

This Chinese version also takes virtue as the middle way ["The superior man accords with the course of the Mean"], but perhaps leaves the Mean and the Way more as metaphor (and a qualitative metaphor) than actually positing the kind of quantitative 'too much/too little' that you find problematic in Aristotle. To quote the Chinese classic again,

"Therefore, the superior man cultivates a friendly harmony, without being weak.-How firm is he in his energy! He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side.-How firm is he in his energy! When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement. How firm is he in his energy! When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing.-How firm is he in his energy!"