The special edition at Philosophical Papers, guest edited by Ben Kotzee & Jeremy Wanderer, has come to fruition, and is available for those with library access at http://www.ajol.info/viewissue.php?jid=190&ab=0 Thanks also to the Editor, Ward E. Jones, and the staff who worked on this edition.

Below are the abstracts of the introduction by the editors, and each of the six papers

Introduction: A Thicker Epistemology?
Abstract: The distinction between thick and thin concepts has been a central part of recent discussion in metaethics. Whilst there is a debate regarding how best to characterise the distinction, it is commonly accepted that ethical theorising traditionally focuses on the thin, leading some to contend that moving from considering thin to thick concepts leads to a very different, and preferable, conception of ethics. Not only does a similar distinction between thick and thin concepts suggest itself within epistemology, traditional discussion within epistemology also seems to focus on the thin in a similar manner. The question of a possible parallel beckons: Is there a comparable distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts? Would a move from thin to thick lead to an alternative and/or preferable epistemology?

1. The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts, A. Thomas
Abstract. This paper examines the treatment of thick ethical concepts in Williams's work in order to evaluate the consistency of his treatment of ethical and epistemic concepts and to assess whether the idea of a thick concept can be extended from ethics to epistemology. A virtue epistemology is described modeled on a cognitivist virtue ethics. Williams's genealogy of the virtues surrounding propositional knowledge (the virtues of ‘truthfulness') is critically evaluated. It is concluded that this genealogy is an important contribution to the project of virtue epistemology. Thick concepts must not only feature in the account but will sustain more of the marks of objectivity than their ethical counterparts. This is so even on Williams's demanding assumptions. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 345-369

2. Trustworthiness, C.Z. Elgin
Abstract. I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such
a belief is not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community.
Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 371-387

3. Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin,
P Väyrynen
Abstract. The distinction between ‘thick' and ‘thin' value concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts. (1) Analogy with ethics offers no straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. (2) Assuming there is such a distinction, there are no semantic grounds for assigning thick epistemic concepts priority over the thin. (3) Nor does the structure of substantive epistemological theory establish that thick epistemic concepts enjoy systematic theoretical priority over the thin. In sum, a good case has yet to be made for any radical theoretical turn to thicker epistemology. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 389-412

4. Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology, G. Axtell & J.A. Carter
Abstract. Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need ‘thick' evaluative concepts? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit commitment to what we argue to be an epistemic analogue of the reductionistic centralist thesis that Bernard Williams in our view successfully challenged in ethics. In this essay, we challenge these traditional dogmas and in doing so align ourselves with what has been recently called the ‘Value Turn' in epistemology. From this perspective, we defend that, contrary to tradition, epistemology does need thick evaluative concepts. Further, the sort of theories that will be able to give thick evaluative concepts a deservedly central role in both belief and agent evaluation are those non-centralist projects that fall within what we call the second-wave of virtue epistemology. We recognize that, in breaking from centralism, there is a worry that a resulting anti-centralist theory will be reductionistic in the other direction making the thick primary. We contend however that second-wave virtue epistemologies should be thought to provide the wave of the right thickness, and as such, constitute the most promising approaches within a field that has become increasingly more normative, diverse and expansive than was the traditional set of problems from which it emerged. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 413-434

5. Metaethics Meets Virtue Epistemology: Salvaging Disagreement about the Epistemically Thick, H. Battaly

Abstract. Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology shift the focus of evaluation from thin concepts to thick ones. Simon Blackburn has argued that a shift to thick ethical concepts dooms us to talking past one another. I contend that virtue epistemologists can answer Blackburn's objection, thus salvaging genuine disagreement about the epistemically thick.
Section I introduces the standard cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses of thick concepts. Section II argues that thick epistemic concepts are subject to combinatorial vagueness. I contend that virtue epistemologists share vague concepts of intellectual virtue and openmindedness. Section III addresses Allan Gibbard's worry that appealing to vagueness exacerbates the problem. I conclude that for genuine disagreement to occur, the parties must (1) share vague concepts; and (2) agree on the goals of their conceptual analyses. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 435-454

6. Is ‘Education' a Thick Epistemic Concept?,
H. Siegel
Abstract. Is ‘education' a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends, of course, on the viability of the ‘thick/thin' distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I will concentrate mainly on the latter, and will argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it; and that, insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education's epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarify the degree to which it makes sense to regard the concept as ‘thick'. I also discuss the relationship between philosophy of education and virtue epistemology and the sense in which being educated might itself be thought to be an epistemic virtue. Finally, I urge virtue epistemologists in particular and
epistemologists generally to turn their attention to questions of education, to further both the philosophy of education and epistemology itself. Philosophical Papers Vol. 37 (3) 2008: pp. 455-469

Guy,

What with reading Adam’s recent post on veritism (I would cross-post this if I knew how), I started thinking again about some points you and Adam make in your paper ‘Just the Right Thickness’. And with the Kent conference on thick concepts coming up I thought it might not be too late to back-up for a minute and talk about thick epistemology.

The big issue regarding ‘thick’ epistemology is how exactly to draw the parallel between the projects of thickening ethics and of thickening epistemology. Let us say that the basic motivation behind shifting our focus from thin to thick concepts in ethics is dissatisfaction with ‘centralism’ (the idea that thin concepts are logically prior to thick concepts). Is exactly the same the case in epistemology? Is it really the case that - in epistemology - the debate is conducted in terms of a bunch of too thin concepts?

A number of people (amongst them Stefaan Cuypers, but I’ve heard the objection frequently) have suggested to me that they can’t see epistemology as thin in the first place. Take the concept expressed by the word ‘knowledge’. If, taking the obvious line, our concept KNOWLEDGE is a sort of composite of our concepts JUSTIFIED, TRUE and BELIEF, then KNOWLEDGE can’t be thin if one of these three are even a bit descriptive. Following this natural suggestion, people have gone on to suggest to me that BELIEF is just a certain kind of cognitive state and that TRUE is just a description of propositions... regarding JUSTIFIED there was more of a range of opinion, but, in any event, the descriptiveness of BELIEF and/or TRUE would make KNOWLEDGE not thin (if indeed it somehow contains the concepts J, T and B). Even if (as I’ve become used to arguing) BELIEF isn’t purely descriptive because it is part of that concept that beliefs aim at the truth, or even if (as I don’t usually dare to argue) TRUTH isn’t purely descriptive because it is part of that concept that beliefs aim at the truth, the result is still that KNOWLEDGE isn’t thin.

If there is a problem with thin-ness in epistemology, then, it will most probably not be to do with the thin-ness of our common conceptions of knowledge, rather the problem will be that justification is conceived of in a thin way. So this is the first disanalogy between the projects of thickening ethics and that of thickening epistemology: it’s not really epistemology as such that we think needs thickening, but our concept JUSTIFICATION (but of course, thickening this concept will have ramifications throughout the subject).

The next thing we want to ask ourselves, then, is whether our concept of justification is indeed thin. Here, too, the answer is not quite what we would expect if we were looking for a straightforward analogy with ethics. Different philosophers have different suggestions regarding what exactly the concept behind occurrences of the word ‘justification’ is. If the content of JUSTIFICATION or JUSTIFIED were just that a belief should be held (if they were merely action-guiding concepts), then they would be thin, but I don’t know who would really subscribe to such a position - maybe some evidentialists? I’m becoming more and more puzzled what a really thin view of justification would be (and who might hold such a view).

On the other hand, plenty philosophers want to advance a conception of justification that is purely descriptive - naturalism depends on JUSTIFICATION turning out to be purely descriptive and stripping the evaluative dimension out of talk about justification is exactly what the causal or reliabilist views offered in support of naturalism seem to be for.

I don’t think that a plausible concept of justification will be descriptive and you guys don’t either. In fact, this is exactly the basis on which you attack the ‘nature and scope’ argument - and its central premise that ‘[k]nowledge and justification are fundamentally non-normative concepts’ (415). The problem with ‘nature and scope’-style epistemology is its veritist axiology (the idea that truth in belief is ultimately the only thing of value in epistemology) and the purely instrumental role that it assigns to justification. If I read you correctly, you would hold that justification is valuable independently of the role it plays in helping people acquire true belief; more, even, there are other things that are of value epistemically than just truth and justification in beliefs.

If so, am I right in thinking that you are coming at thick epistemology from the opposite direction compared to those who advocate moving from thin to thick ethics? In ethics, it is thin ethics that is rejected in favour of thick ethics, but the problem that you see with much thinking about justification is not that it is too thin but that it is too descriptive. The problem with ‘nature and scope’-style epistemology (naturalised epistemology, basically?) is that it isn’t thin or even thick but completely ‘dry’ - it is conceived of in a way that doesn’t involve values at all. (If I misunderstand you on this point - that the problem is really that epistemology is too thin - what is it that is specifically thin about the main target of your paper, i.e. veritism?)

I think that Williams's distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ in ethics is not just about the difference between two kinds of concepts, but between three: ‘thin’ concepts e.g. OUGHT, GOOD), ‘thick’ concepts (e.g. COURAGE) and ‘non-evaluative’ (‘dry’!) concepts (e.g. GREEN, LUNAR).

The reason I think we need thick concepts in epistemology is exactly the opposite to why ethics needs them. Ethics, according to Williams, needs thickening up in order that ethical debates can be more world-guided; this is achieved by adding a descriptive dimension to the thin mix. Epistemology also needs to be thick, but this will be achieved (at least for naturalised epistemology) by thinning it down, or by adding the evaluative element to what is at the moment a dry mix. The reason that epistemology needs to be thick is that it is at the moment not action-guiding at all, but needs to be. (I’m speaking very metaphorically here and don’t mean to imply that the evaluative and descriptive dimensions of thick concepts can be separated out - Heather makes clear in her paper why not.)

Even though the project won’t be the same as in ethics, what ‘thick’ talk in epistemology offers is another way to think of the normativity of epistemology. I’ve become used to arguing the normativity vs. naturalism question (endlessly - I write of this elsewhere) over the question of whether our beliefs should be true (or whether it is just for the most part advantageous for them to be true). 'Thick' epistemology can help open a different front in this debate: reject the idea that the issue comes down just to the narrow one of whether the value of true belief is instrumental or internal (part of what it is to be a belief) and debate the normativity question over the broader front of other epistemic values too (like the value of justification for its own sake, the value of truthfulness, trustworthiness, understanding, etc.)

Hi Ben, Yes, the upcoming Thick Concepts conference looks great and I wish I were going.

Thanks for the comments on our contribution to your special edition of Philosophical Papers. You had alot of thoughts on it, and at the end said "debate the normativity question over the broader front of other epistemic values too (like the value of justification for its own sake, the value of truthfulness, trustworthiness, understanding, etc.)." Yes, I'd agree with that and think that virtue reliabilists and responsibilists can both want to 'thicken' epistemology through a richer, creamery epistemological axiology.

There are other things that are of value epistemically than just truth and justification in beliefs, but a thin-focused deontological tradition makes it difficult to see why the intellectual virtues bear upon questions of epistemic value. This is just another way of saying, as you suggested putting it, that its "justification" is conceived of in too thin a way. Or another way, that justification as the focus of the internalist/externalist debate, has focused epistemology's energies on a deontological concepts (and propositional justification), rather than axiological ones (and habits contributing to doxastic and personal justification). So if *part* of the issue regarding ‘thick’ epistemology is how exactly to draw the parallel between the projects of thickening ethics and of thickening epistemology, I'd still maintain that a common rejection among virtue theorists of "centralism" a useful way--though not of course the only way. Our paper talks about how veritist epistemology is a shared assumption of the internalist/ externalist debate, but we didn't say much about how each can assume a version of epistemic centralism. The idea that thin concepts are logically or conceptually prior to thick concepts gets expressed, as I see it, in the influential insistence by the whole internalist tradition, of the conceptual priority of propositional justification to doxastic justification (Feldman, Conee, and many others). Propositional justification as these internalists understand it is essentially the upholding of a deontic duty to always be maximizing "synchronic epistemic justification." So for myself, in my Bled paper, I'll be trying to support the genuinely epistemic value of diachronic rationality (and virtuous habits of inquiry and actions in the course of inquiry), as against the centralist's dogma that our interests in the diachronic is are merely practical and unconnected with epistemic value. The seems like an over-brave distinction to me, and I doubt that synchronic epistemic rationality is the measure of epistemic value...But whose afraid of 'diachronic encroachment'?