New JBer Benoit Gaultier's has sent us his draft paper as delivered his interesting draft paper as delivered last week at the Epistemic Agency Conference. Find it in JB Library.
Benoit 1) analyzes a number of objections raised against the view that the truth-value of doxastic responsibility claims--hence following Greco, of knowledge attributions--vary contextually and 2) brings out some radical consequences of such objections, and 3) explores some benefits of the approach taken by C. Hookway, namely that the skeptical problem of the possibility of knowledge is a version of the problem of freedom of will.
Benoit 1) analyzes a number of objections raised against the view that the truth-value of doxastic responsibility claims--hence following Greco, of knowledge attributions--vary contextually and 2) brings out some radical consequences of such objections, and 3) explores some benefits of the approach taken by C. Hookway, namely that the skeptical problem of the possibility of knowledge is a version of the problem of freedom of will.