A. Virtue Epistemology > Conor McHugh on "Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency"

McHugh's paper does not express virtue theory directly, but shares the inquiry-focused orientation that many JBers (like me!) favor.

Abstract. How can we be responsible for our beliefs? It is tempting to think that this responsibility is grounded in a form of agency that we exercise in our doxastic lives. If so, what exactly is the nature of this connection, and can it be given some deeper explanation? In this paper I argue that the central condition on responsibility is a kind of reasons-responsiveness, and that it is only because we are doxastic agents—because we can regulate our beliefs through the activity of inquiry, and, in particular, acts of judging—that as believers we can satisfy this condition.
July 21, 2014 | Registered CommenterGuy Axtell