A. Virtue Epistemology > Carter and Pritchard on "Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement"

J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard have posted a draft of a paper forthcoming in PPR. []

ABSTRACT. According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how
just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a , 2011b; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.
January 16, 2014 | Registered CommenterGuy Axtell