Your comments are invited on Abrol Fairweather's revised paper, soon forthcoming in History and Philosophy of Science. The paper is now accessible at the link for "JB LIbrary of Papers and Drafts" below the LOGIN button. Just cursor down to Fairweather to upload it. The paper discusses very pertinent topics regarding theory choice in science, and argues for an essential role for Duhemian 'bon sens' or 'good sense,' a thesis which though qualified remains highly ammenable to virtue epistemology.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines competing interpretations of Pierre Duhem’s theory of good sense recently defended by David Stump and Milena Ivanova and defends a hybrid reading that accommodates the intuitions of both readings. At issue between Stump and Ivanova is whether Duhemian good sense is a virue theoretic concept. I approach the issue from the broader perspective of determining the epistemic value of good sense per se, and argue for a mitigated virtue theoretic reading that identifies an essential role for good sense in theory choice. I also show that many important issues in both philosophy of science and ‘mainstream’ value driven epistemology are illuminated by the debate over the epistemic value of good sense. In particular, philosophical work on the nature of cognitive character, rule governed rationality and the prospects of epistemic value t-monism are illuminated by virtue theoretic readings of Duhemian good sense.

The published version of Abrol's paper is available online in PDF, advance of hardcopy, at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368111001075